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STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT AND GUARANTIES: AN
EXERCISE IN CARTOGRAPHY
GERALD T. MCLAUGHLIN*
"Boundaries are not just drawn, they undergo a process of
development.'"
The drafting of a Restatement of Suretyship provides a conven-
ient opportunity for some cartography-that is, for mapping the
borders between a standby letter of credit and a contract of guar-
anty. This mapping of borders is not only a timely exercise, it is
also an important one. There are several reasons for this. First, in
recent years, there has been an explosion in the use of both letters
of credit and guaranties in financing transactions.2 Second, the
precise differences between the two legal regimes are not always
well understood by lawyers. Third, institutions-most notably U.S.
banks-are usually empowered to issue standby credits but not
guaranties.3 For these institutions, the issuance of a guaranty
would normally be an ultra vires act.4 Thus, it is particularly im-
portant for bank issuers to be conscious of the differences between
a standby letter of credit and a guaranty.
Part I of this Essay shows that, superficially at least, the borders
between standby letters of credit and contracts of guaranty appear
to be well settled. A standby letter of credit is a "beneficiary ori-
ented" payment instrument that is both documentary in nature
and independent of the overall financial transaction of which it is a
part.5 A contract of guaranty, on the other hand, is a more "appli-
* Dean, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. Member, Board of Advisers, Re-
statement (Third) of Suretyship.
1. GEORGE J. DEMKO, WHY IN-THE WORLD: ADVENTURES IN GEOGRAPHY 66 (1992).
2. See Henry Harfield, An Agnostic View, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1990).
3. See Richard A. Lord, The No Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Con-
troversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46, 52 (1979) (citing Bowen v. Needles Nat'l Bank, 94 F. 925, 927
(9th Cir. 1899)).
4. For a history of the "no guaranty" rule for U.S. banks, see, e.g., id. at 46-58.
5. For a general discussion of credit and guaranty instruments, see ARTHUR A. STEARNS,
THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP §§ 4.1-.3 (5th ed. 1951); Egon Guttman, Bank Guarantees and
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cant oriented" payment instrument that is nondocumentary in na-
ture and dependent on the overall financial transaction.6
Part II demonstrates, however, that upon closer analysis, the
borders between standby credits and contracts of guaranty are not
so well settled as they may first appear. For example, either be-
cause of drafting or judicial construction, standby letters of credit
are sometimes enforced using legal rules that are borrowed from
the law of guaranty. In some situations, these standby credits are
treated as retaining their character as letters of credit, while in
other situations, they are treated as having become guaranties.
Predicting in advance just how they will be treated is often
difficult.
Part III shows, however, that ill-defined borders separating
standby credits from contracts of guaranty are not necessarily
problematic. Ill-defined borders usually indicate borders that are
"undergoing a process of development."' 7 Just as it is normal for
those who reside along national borders to borrow from a neighbor-
ing culture, so too it is normal for letter-of-credit law to borrow
from guaranty law, and vice versa." In fact, in recent years, courts
have grown to tolerate, if not actually encourage, this borrowing.9
I. THE NATURE OF STANDBY LETTERS OF CREDIT AND
CONTRACTS OF GUARANTY
The standby letter of credit and the contract of guaranty are
both credit-enhancement devices.'* By nature, however, the
standby letter of credit is "beneficiary oriented," meaning that the
Standby Letters of Credit: Moving Towards a Uniform Approach, 56 BROOK L. REV. 167,
168-71 (1990).
6. See Guttman, supra note 5, at 168-71. For a succinct description of the differences
between a standby credit and a guaranty, see Bank of North Carolina v. Rock Island Bank,
570 F.2d 202, 206 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 630 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1980); JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 713-14
(2d ed. 1980).
7. DEMKO, supra note 1, at 66.
8. Courts frequently apply to standby letters of credit contract principles borrowed from
the law of guaranty. For a discussion of these issues, see Gerald T. McLaughlin, On the
Periphery of Letter-of-Credit Law: Softening the Rigors of Strict Compliance, 106 BANKING
L.J. 4 passim (1989).
9. See infra part II.
10. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CRED1' COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY CRED-
ITS 2-4 to -7 (2d ed. 1991).
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standby credit favors the interests of the beneficiary of the credit
who in most financial transactions will be the obligee/creditor. 11 A
contract of guaranty, on the other hand, is more "applicant ori-
ented." "Applicant oriented" means that, when compared to a
standby letter of credit, the contract of guaranty tends to favor the
interests of the party applying for the guaranty (who in most fi-
nancial transactions will be the obligor/debtor), rather than the
party who is the beneficiary of the guaranty.
12
A. Standby Letters of Credit
To help understand the beneficiary-oriented nature of a standby
letter of credit, let me describe a classic standby letter-of-credit
transaction. Typically, a standby letter-of-credit transaction is
composed of three separate and independent contracts.' 3 For ex-
ample, assume that X and Y enter intQ a contract whereby X
promises to build Y a house by June 1. X promises to pay Y
$50,000 in liquidated damages if X fails to build the house by that
date.1 4 To guarantee payment of that sum, Y requires that X have
Solid Gold Bank issue a $50,000 standby letter of credit in favor of
Y. The terms of the credit entitle Y to demand payment from
Solid Gold Bank by presenting the bank with a $50,000 sight draft
and a written certificate attesting to X's failure to complete the
11. See id. at 1-15 to -21. For a thorough definition of a standby credit, see id. Professor
Dolan states:
The standby credit beneficiary ... reasonably expects that he will receive
cash in the event of nonperformance, that he will receive it promptly, and that
he will receive it before any litigation with the obligor . . . takes place. The
standby credit has the opposite effect of the surety contract: It reverses the
financial burden of the parties during litigation.
Id. at 1-18.
12. The terms "beneficiary oriented" and "applicant oriented" were deliberately chosen
in lieu of the terms "obligee oriented" and "obligor oriented" to describe relevant differ-
ences between standby letters of credit and contracts of guaranty. The reader will realize,
however, that since the terms "beneficiary oriented" and "applicant oriented" are taken
from letter-of-credit law, the terminology is new to contracts, of guaranty.
13. The three-contract model used in this Essay is described in many cases. See, e.g.,
Insurance Co. v. Heritage Bank, N.A., 595 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1979).
14. For the purposes of this Essay, it will be assumed that the $50,000 represents legiti-
mate liquidated damages and not a disguised penalty. See Gerald T. McLaughlin, Standby
Letters of Credit and Penalty Clauses: An Unexpected Synergy, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1982).
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necessary construction of the house by June 1 and failure to pay
the $50,000 in liquidated damages.
This contract between X and Y, whereby X must complete con-
struction of the house by June 1, is the underlying contract, Con-
tract I, that necessitates the issuance of the standby credit. The
contract between X and Solid Gold Bank whereby X applies to the
bank for the issuance of the standby credit and promises to reim-
burse Solid Gold Bank in the event that the bank must honor its
letter-of-credit payment obligation is Contract II. 15 Finally, Con-
tract III is the actual standby letter of credit that is issued by
Solid Gold Bank and established in favor of Y' 6 whereby Solid
Gold Bank irrevocably obligates itself to pay Y $50,000 if Y
presents the required sight draft and written certificate attesting
to X's failure to complete the timely construction of the house and
pay the liquidated damages amount.
There are two cardinal principles of letter-of-credit law. First,
Solid Gold Bank's (issuing bank's) payment obligation to benefi-
ciary Y under the letter of credit (Contract III) is documentary in
nature; that is, Solid Gold Bank is obligated to pay beneficiary Y
only if Y presents the necessary draft and written certificate at-
testing to X's default in advance of the expiry date of the credit.17
Second, absent fraud, Solid Gold Bank's payment obligation under
Contract III is separate from, and independent of, the other con-
tracts that generated it-Contract I (the construction contract be-
tween X and Y) and Contract II (the reimbursement agreement
15. The reimbursement contract-usually contained on the reverse side of the issuing
bank's letter-of-credit application form-may also contain language whereby the applicant
grants the issuing bank a security interest in certain collateral of the applicant to secure
payment of the reimbursement obligation.
16. A letter of credit is "established" with respect to the beneficiary of the credit when
the credit, or an authorized written advice of its issuance, has been received by the benefi-
ciary. U.C.C. § 5-106(1)(b) (1990).
17. The documentary nature of a letter of credit is emphasized in the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No.
400, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS art. 4 (1983) [hereinafter
U.C.P.]. Article 4 provides: "In credit operations all parties concerned deal in documents,
and not in goods, services and/or other performances to which the documents may relate."
1142 [Vol. 34:1139
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between Solid Gold Bank as the issuer of the credit and X as the
applicant for the credit).18
It is these two principles that mainly account for the beneficiary-
oriented nature of a standby letter of credit. In deciding whether
to honor its credit, the issuing bank is obligated to review only the
facial compliance of the documents presented.' The bank need
not, and in fact may not, embroil itself in the time-consuming pro-
cess of evaluating the facts that underlie those documents. 20 Be-
cause the issuing bank undertakes an obligation to pay only
against documents and not against the truth or falsity of the facts
stated in those documents, the beneficiary of the credit is thereby
assured of swift payment.21 Similarly, because the issuing bank un-
dertakes a payment obligation that is independent of Contracts I
and II, the beneficiary will be assured of payment despite the exis-
tence of disputes (other than those based on fraud) that arise with
respect to the underlying contract (Contract I) or the reimburse-
ment agreement (Contract II).22
Of course, once the beneficiary of the credit has been paid and
the issuing bank's Contract III payment obligation has been fully
satisfied, nothing in letter-of-credit law prevents the rights of the
beneficiary with respect to Contract I from being subsequently
readjusted-either through negotiation or litigation. One thing is
certain, however: during any subsequent negotiation or litigation,
the beneficiary-oriented nature of a letter of credit means that the
beneficiary will be the stakeholder of the proceeds of the letter-of-
credit payment.
18. The independence principle is also set forth in the U.C.P. Article 3 provides: "Credits,
by their nature, are separate transactions from the sales or other contract(s) on which they
may be based and banks are in no way concerned with or bound by such contract(s) ......
Id. art. 3; see also U.C.C. § 5-109(1)(b) (stating that an issuing bank is not liable for acts or
omissions of parties other than itself); id. § 5-114(1) (stating that an issuing bank must
honor a demand for payment that complies with the relevant terms of the credit, regardless
of whether the underlying contract has been breached).
19. See supra note 18.
20. See U.C.C. § 5-114(1).
21. See id.
22. See id.
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B. Contracts of Guaranty
A contract of guaranty is more applicant oriented in nature than
a standby letter of credit.23 In its classic form at least, a contract of
guaranty is nondocumentary, requiring the guarantor to honor its
guaranty after evaluating not the facial conformity of documents,
but rather the truth or falsity of facts. Similarly and almost as a
corollary of what has just been said, a contract of guaranty is,
therefore, dependent on the contracts that give rise to its
issuance."
Assume again ,that X and Y enter into the aforementioned con-
struction contract, the terms of which obligate X to complete Y's
house by June 1 or pay $50,000 in liquidated damages if X fails to
complete construction by that date. To secure payment of this
sum, Y requires that X have a third party, Q, issue a $50,000 guar-
anty in favor of Y. Q's guaranty entitles Y to claim $50,000 from Q
if X defaults on its obligation to complete construction of the
house by June 1 and fails to pay Y the necessary $50,000 in liqui-
dated damages. According to classic principles of guaranty law, Q's
contract of guaranty (Contract III) is dependent upon the underly-
ing construction contract (Contract I).25 Put another way, Q will be
obligated to pay on its guaranty only if X in fact defaults on its
obligations to complete construction of the house by June 1 and to
pay the $50,000 in liquidated damages. If, for example, X were co-
erced by Y into accepting the June 1 completion date, then Q
would not be required to honor its guaranty because X would not
in fact have defaulted on its Contract I performance obligation
and been required to pay Y $50,000 in liquidated damages. 26 Be-
cause a contract of guaranty does not necessarily assure beneficiary
Y of payment if disputes arise with respect to the underlying con-
struction contract, it is to that extent less beneficiary oriented than
a standby letter of credit. Looked at from the other side, because
the contract of guaranty allows guarantor Q to utilize the defenses
23. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. For a thorough analysis of contracts of
guaranty, see Peter A. Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Com-
mercial Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REv. 655, 658-60 (1983).
24. See DOLAN, supra note 10, at 1-18.
25. See id.
26. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 118 (1941).
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of X, the principal obligor, as defenses to its own payment obliga-
tion, the guaranty is more applicant oriented in nature than the
standby letter of credit.
IH. THE ILL-DEFINED BORDERS BETWEEN LETTER-OF-CREDIT
LAW AND GUARANTY LAW
Some types of payment obligations are not clearly either letters
of credit or contracts of guaranty, but lie along the border separat-
ing the standby letter of credit from the contract of guaranty.27
These "borderland" obligations usually occur in one of two ways.
First, parties may, either consciously or unconsciously, include in
one form of payment obligation a term borrowed from the other
type of payment obligation. The most common example of this is
the parties' inclusion of a nondocumentary payment condition in a
standby letter of credit. Second, courts may enforce one type of
payment obligation using procedural and substantive rules that fit
more appropriately with another type of payment obligation.28 For
example, a court might allow the issuing bank to interplead the
beneficiary and the applicant before honoring its letter-of-credit
payment obligation.
These "borderland" payment obligations are troublesome be-
cause they indicate that payment instruments are not always one
thing or the other-they can sometimes partake of two cultures.
They demonstrate that the borders between the standby credit
and the contract of guaranty are not well settled. What is particu-
larly problematic is that it is often difficult to predict what law a
court will apply to one of these "borderland" instruments-letter-
of-credit law, guaranty law, or a mixture of the two.
To show the ill-,defined nature of the standby credit-guaranty
border, three types of "borderland" payment obligations will be
described in this Essay: standby letters of credit that contain non-
documentary payment conditions, standby letters of credit issued
27. See Bank of N.C. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 206 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978) (describ-
ing instances in which the distinctions between letters of credit and contracts of guaranty
become blurred), rev'd, 630 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1980).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 56-66.
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subject to the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees 29 (U.R.D.G.)
and what I will call "quasi-standby letters of credit"-i.e., credits
that are enforced using rules borrowed from another body of law
that have the effect of either allowing or encouraging an applicant
to present its case against payment of the credit before the benefi-
ciary receives payment.
A. Standby Letters of Credit with Nondocumentary
Payment Conditions
Occasionally, a bank will include a nondocumentary payment
condition in a letter of credit. A nondocumentary payment condi-
tion can be defined as a term in a letter of credit that conditions
payment not against the presentation of a document but, rather,
against the ascertainment of the truth or falsity of some fact in
that document.3 0 For example, a standby letter of credit may be
drafted in such a way that the issuing bank obligates itself to pay
if the applicant defaults on performing its underlying obligation.
Here, the condition triggering the bank's obligation to pay is non-
documentary in nature-i.e., the issuing bank is obligated to pay
only if it determines that the applicant has in fact defaulted; its
payment obligation is not triggered by the presentation of a docu-
ment attesting to the applicant's default. Thus, the inclusion of
the nondocumentary payment condition in a standby letter of
credit creates a "borderland" payment obligation; the resulting
credit contains terms that are characteristic of both a standby
credit and a guaranty.
Nondocumentary payment conditions come in two forms; they
may be either fundamental to or ancillary to the operation of the
letter of credit.31 For example, if the nondocumentary payment
condition in the hypothetical-the default of the applicant on its
underlying performance obligation to construct the house by June
1-were drafted into a standby letter of credit, the nondocumen-
29. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 458, UNIFORM RULES FOR DEMAND
GUARANTEES (1992) [hereinafter U.R.D.G.].
30. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 37. On the entire issue of nondocumentary payment
conditions, see ABA Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of
U.C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAW. 1521, 1546-61 (1990).
31. See DOLAN, supra note 10, at 2-7 to -10.
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tary condition would obviously be fundamental to the operation of
the letter of credit. The main purpose of the letter of credit would
be to protect the beneficiary against being damaged by the default
of the applicant.
Other forms of nondocumentary payment conditions, however,
could be ancillary to the purpose of the credit. For example, a
commercial letter of credit may provide for the presentation of va-
rious shipping documents describing the goods and also require
that the goods be shipped on a vessel that is not more than fifteen
years old.3 2 This latter condition is nondocumentary in nature; to
determine that the condition has been satisfied, the issuing bank
would have to verify the actual age of the shipping vessel. This
nondocumentary payment condition, however, is also ancillary to
the central purpose of the credit, which is to pay for documents
evidencing the shipment of specifically described merchandise.
The proposed draft of a revised Article 5 of the U.C.C. would
handle each type of nondocumentary payment condition in a dif-
ferent way. 3
1. Ancillary Nondocumentary Payment Conditions
According to revised Article 5, a nondocumentary payment con-
dition that is ancillary to the purpose of the letter of credit will not
affect the nature of the instrument as a letter of credit.34 To pro-
tect payment of the standby credit from being dependent on the
underlying transaction even to the smallest degree, the drafters of
revised Article 5 have proposed that an ancillary nondocumentary
payment condition (such as the age of the shipping vessel in the
aforementioned hypothetical) should be disregarded.3 5 The issuing
bank must pay the credit if and when all the documentary condi-
tions are satisfied.
32. The example is taken from U.C.C. Revised Article 5 Letters of Credit § 5-110 cmt. 5
(Draft, Mar. 31, 1993).
33. See id. § 5-102 cmt. 6; id. § 5-110 cmt. 5.
34. Id. § 5-102 cmt. 6.
35. Id. § 5-110(d) & cmt. 5.
11471993]
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2. Fundamental Nondocumentary Payment Conditions
A nondocumentary payment condition that is fundamental to
the purpose of a letter of credit, however, will be treated very dif-
ferently under revised Article 5. According to the drafters of re-
vised Article 5, such a nondocumentary payment condition will af-
fect the nature of the instrument as a letter of credit.36 Though
labeled as a letter of credit, the instrument will not be treated as a
letter of credit under the law.3 7 Rather, according to the comments
to revised Article 5, the resulting instrument will most likely be
treated as a form of guaranty or other contractual arrangement.3 8
One reason for treating such an instrument as something other
than a letter of credit is the applicant-oriented nature of its funda-
mental term. To understand what this means, return for a moment
to our original hypothetical in which the applicant agrees to con-
struct a house for the beneficiary by June 1 or, failing that, to pay
the beneficiary $50,000 in liquidated damages. The fundamental
reason for Solid Gold Bank's issuing a letter of credit was to pro-
tect the beneficiary/obligee against being damaged by the appli-
cant/obligor's default in the construction of the beneficiary's
house. Assume, however, that the letter of credit is drafted in such
a way that before payment can be made to the beneficiary/obligee,
Solid Gold Bank must determine whether the applicant/obligor did
in fact default on its underlying obligation to construct the house
by June 1. In making this determination, the applicant's defenses
become important to Solid Gold Bank because the bank is entitled
to rely on them in justifying its refusal to pay.
Unless the applicant/obligor actually defaulted and was there-
fore required to pay $50,000 in liquidated damages, Solid Gold
Bank need not pay. If the applicant/obligor has a defense excusing
its failure to build the house by June 1, then there would be no
default.39 The factual analysis relative to the question of default
gives a full hearing to the applicant's position on this central term
prior to the bank's honoring its letter-of-credit obligation.
36. See id. § 5-110 cmt. 5.
37. See id. § 5-102 cmt. 6.
38. See id.
39. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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B. Standby Credits Issued Subject to the Uniform Rules on
Demand Guarantees
In 1992, the International Chamber of Commerce issued the
Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees4 ° to cover independent de-
mand guarantees, a type of instrument common in Europe.41 The
definition of demand guarantee in the U.R.D.G., however, is broad
enough to cover standby letters of credit.42 Although the drafters
of the U.R.D.G. state that issuers of letters of credit should con-
tinue to issue their credits subject to the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits43 (U.C.P.), the possibility still
exists that an instrument labeled as a letter of credit may be issued
subject to the U.R.D.G. The possibility also exists that a European
bank may issue a letter of credit subject to the U.R.D.G. and then
ask a U.S. bank to "confirm" such a credit under these rules.
If such a credit or confirmation were issued, it remains to be
seen how a U.S. court would treat this "borderland" instrument.
Article 17 of the U.R.D.G. would require the issuer of a standby
credit subject to the U.R.D.G. to inform the applicant whenever a
draw is made.44 No such duty currently exists either under the
U.C.P. or under letter-of-credit law generally.45 The issuer's duty
to notify the applicant of a draw makes a standby credit issued
under the U.R.D.G. more applicant oriented than a comparable
standby credit issued under the U.C.P. A rule requiring an issuer
to give notice of a draw is intended to provide the applicant with
adequate time to review the merits of the draw and, when appro-
priate, to seek to enjoin payment of the draw. Because the rule has
the effect of reducing the certainty of payment represented by the
40. U.R.D.G. (1992).
41. Michael Rowe, International Chamber of Commerce Drafts New Rules to Regulate
Bank Guarantees, THOMSON'S INT'L BANIUNG REGULATOR, July 13, 1992, at 3.
42. See U.R.D.G. art. 2(a). See the Introduction to the U.R.D.G., in which the drafters
admit that standby credits are "technically" within the definition of the U.R.D.G.'s "de-
mand guarantee." Id. at 4-5.
43. Id. at 4.
44. Article 17 of the U.R.D.G. states in relevant part: "[I]n the event of a demand the
Guarantor shall without' delay so inform the Principal or where applicable its Instructing
Party and in that case the Instructing Party shall so inform the Principal." U.R.D.G. art. 17.
With respect to a standby letter of credit issued subject to the U.R.D.G., the issuing bank
would be deemed the guarantor and the applicant would be deemed the principal.
45. See Five Star Parking v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 703 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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standby letter of credit, it is in this sense more oriented in favor of
the applicant/obligor and therefore more akin to a rule of guaranty
law. Nevertheless, the willingness of U.S. courts in several letter-
of-credit cases to impose on issuing banks notice requirements may
bespeak a tolerant attitude towards this Article 17 requirement. 46
If this is the case, the notice requirement imposed on issuing banks
under Article 17 may not affect the essential character of either the
U.R.D.G. credit or confirmation as a letter of credit.
C. "Quasi-Standby Letters of Credit"
As I noted earlier, a standby letter of credit is beneficiary ori-
ented as compared to a guaranty that-at least in its classic
form-is more applicant oriented. The independence principle, of
course, is the basis for the standby letter of credit's beneficiary ori-
entation. By weakening the independence principle, however,
courts often blur the distinction between standby credits and con-
tracts of guaranty. The main way in which courts weaken the inde-
pendence of standby credits is through the application of proce-
dural and substantive rules to letters of credit that have the effect
of either allowing or encouraging an applicant/obligor to present
its case against payment before the beneficiary/obligee receives
payment.4 7 Under close scrutiny, the resulting payment instru-
ments are not clearly standby letters of credit or contracts of
guaranty.
1. Procedural Rules
On occasion, courts have permitted issuing banks to resort to in-
terpleader when faced with a pdyment draw from a beneficiary and
an objection to payment from the applicant.4 s Interpleader affords
46. See George Weisz & Jonathan I. Blackman, Standby Letters of Credit After Iran:
Remedies of the Account Party, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 355, 356 n.6.
47. See, e.g., Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Indus., Int'l, 767 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985) (dem-
onstrating one court's apparent indifference to the independence principle); Paccar Int'l,
Inc. v. Commercial Bank, 587 F. Supp. 783 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (evidencing the predisposition
of some courts to litigate in the credit controversy questions that arise out of related con-
tracts), vacated, 757 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing on appeal on a jurisdictional
point).
48. See Algemene Bank Nederland N.V. v. Soysen Tarim Urunleri Dis Tiscaret Ve
Sanayi, A.S., 748 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). But see Royal Bank v. Weiss, 567 N.Y.S.2d
1150 [Vol. 34:1139
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the applicant for the credit the opportunity to present its case
against honoring the credit before the proceeds of the credit are
paid over to the beneficiary.49 A declaratory judgment action
brought by, the issuing bank prior to paying its credit has an effect
similar to an interpleader action,50 in that payment to the benefi-
ciary is delayed until the applicant has a hearing on its arguments
against paying the beneficiary. The effect of interpleader and de-
claratory judgment actions is therefore to turn the standby letter
of credit into a payment instrument that resembles, at least in
part, a guaranty. Just as the principal obligor's case against paying
a guaranty will be fully reviewed before a guarantor will honor its
guaranty, so too will the applicant/obligor's case be reviewed
before a letter of credit is paid.
Not all general rules of procedure, however, are as harmful to
the independence of the standby letter of credit as interpleader
and declaratory judgment actions. So-called "notice injunc-
tions"-injunctions that require the issuing bank to give the appli-
cant advance notice before a letter of credit is paid 51-do not per
se allow the applicant to present its case against payment before
the issuing bank honors its credit.5 2 Nonetheless, "notice injunc-
tions" harm the standby credit by giving the applicant/obligor
time to consider whether or not to enjoin payment of the letter of
credit.
2. Substantive Rules
A guarantor can utilize most of its principal's defenses to pay-
ment in determining whether it is obligated to honor its guar-
anty.5 3 This, of course, is not the case with an issuer of a standby
letter of credit. In most circumstances, section 5-114(2) of the
U.C.C. allows an issuing bank to refuse to honor (or be enjoined
707 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that because the issuing bank did not face multiple liability, it
was not a stakeholder and therefore could not proceed by way of interpleader).
49. See DOLAN, supra note 10, at 3-26.
50. See In re Air Conditioning, Inc., 55 B.R. 157 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 72 B.R. 657 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 845 F.2d 293
(11th Cir. 1988).
51. See Weisz & Blackman, supra note 46, at 356 n.6.
52. See DOLAN, supra note 10, at 7-77 to -79.
53. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 117-118, 126 (1941).
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from honoring) its letter of credit only if the beneficiary has perpe-
trated fraud in Contract I (the underlying contract). 4 Absent
fraud in Contract I, however, the issuing bank cannot utilize any of
its applicant/obligor's Contract I defenses in determining whether
to pay on its letter of credit. Not being able to rely on applicant
defenses, of course, is fundamental to the independence principle
of letter-of-credit law.
Courts and commentators, however, have occasionally suggested
that an issuing bank can utilize Contract I defenses in addition to
the beneficiary's fraud to justify its refusal to honor its letter-of-
credit obligation.5 These decisions, of course, weaken the indepen-
dence principle and blur the borders separating the standby letter
of credit from the contract of guaranty.
The case of Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 56 is a recent
example of a court's acknowledging that, in appropriate circum-
stances, it would have permitted a Contract I defense other than
the beneficiary's fraud to affect payment of a letter of credit. 57 In
Ross Bicycles, Citibank issued a one million dollar letter of credit
in favor of beneficiary Ross Bicycles for the account of Wedtech
Corporation. 8 After Wedtech filed for bankruptcy, Ross Bicycles
drew under the credit.59 Citibank interposed various defenses to
Ross Bicycles' draw. 0 One of Citibank's main defenses was the al-
leged illegality of the underlying Ross Bicycles-Wedtech contract. 1
54. See U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(b) (1990); id. § 5-114 cmt. 2. The fraud in U.C.C. § 5-114(2)
refers to fraud in Contract I. See Rockwell Int'l Systems, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d
583, 589 (2d Cir. 1983). But see FDIC v. Bank of San Francisco, 817 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an issuer of a letter of credit was not authorized to dishonor a
draft for fraud outside documents required by the letter of credit).
55. See Fleet Bank v. Druce, 791 F. Supp. 14, 15-17 (D. Me. 1992) (discussing bad faith
conduct of the beneficiary); Ross Bicycles, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 577 N.Y.S.2d 827, 827-28
(App. Div. 1991) (holding that in appropriate circumstances, illegality in Contract I can be
used as a defense to payment by the issuing bank); United City Merchants (Invs.) Ltd. v.
Royal Bank, 2 All E.R. 720 (1982) (addressing Contract I illegality); Gerald T. McLaughlin,
Letters of Credit and Illegal Contracts: The Limits of the Independence Principle, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1197 (1989) (arguing that American courts should recognize the "illegality excep-
tion" to the independence principle).
56. 577 N.Y.S.2d 827.
57. Id. at 826-29.
58. Id. at 827.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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The New York Appellate Division, however, was not persuaded by
Citibank's illegality defense, citing three reasons. First, according
to the court, Citibank offered only "conclusory allegations" with
respect to the possible illegality of Ross Bicycles' dealings with
Wedtech.6 2 Second, under New York law, for Citibank's illegality
defense to be valid, the alleged illegality would have to be " 'cen-
tral to or a dominant part of the plaintiff's whole course of con-
duct in performance of the contract' "63 but Citibank submitted no
evidence that Ross Bicycles' conduct met this requirement. Third,
Citibank was a "third party" in the sense that it was simply hold-
ing the property of one of the parties who might be participating
in some illegality without itself being engaged in that illegality and
as such was not entitled to use the defense.64
Although the court did not permit the alleged Contract I illegal-
ity to affect payment of the letter of credit in this particular case,
it did suggest that the defense would have been valid if the allega-
tions of illegality had not been conclusory and the alleged illegality
had been " 'central to or a dominant part of the plaintiff's whole
course of conduct in performance of the contract.' ",65 Inferentially,
the court in Ross Bicycles seems to have recognized a new excep-
tion to the independence principle and a new defense available to
issuing banks who wish to dishonor their credits. Although recog-
nizing Contract I illegality as an exception to the independence
principle seems to be a correct result,66 it does further confuse the
distinction between a letter of credit and a guaranty. It creates yet
another breach in the wall that is supposed to keep Contract I de-
fenses separate from, and independent of, Contract III.
62. Id. at 828.
63. Id. (citing McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 166 N.E.2d 494, 497-98 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1960)).
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing McConnell, 166 N.E.2d at 497-98).
66. It would have been helpful if the New York appellate court had provided clearer guid-
ance on the issue of illegality in the underlying contract as a defense to payment of a letter
of credit. One fruitful path of analysis might have been to consider in this context the old
common law distinction between acts that are mala prohibita (illegal because prohibited)
and those that are mala in se (illegal because intrinsically harmful to society).
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III. IN DEFENSE OF DYNAMIC BORDERS
It seems to this author at least that rigid borders between
standby letters of credit and contracts of guaranty are not necessa-
rily a good thing. In the political arena, barbed-wire fences and
mine fields limit healthy intercourse between nations. 7 Similarly,
in the legal arena, a too-rigid insistence on symmetry-an "all or
nothing" approach with respect to the rules applicable to standby
credits or guaranties-will limit healthy interaction between the
two. One of the underlying policies of commercial law is to permit
the continued expansion of business practices through agreement
of the parties.68 Giving the parties in the marketplace the choice of
drafting financial instruments that are either slightly less benefi-
ciary oriented than the classic standby letter of credit, or slightly
less applicant oriented than the classic contract of guaranty, is
clearly a desirable policy goal. Generally speaking, this goal has
been achieved in guaranty law. In the text of the guaranty, a guar-
antor can waive reliance on all of the principal obligor's defenses
without changing the nature of the obligation as a guaranty. The
same, however, cannot be said about letter-of-credit law.
The issue of subrogation crystallizes the point being made here.
The majority view is that the independence principle of letter-of-
credit law prohibits applying the doctrine of subrogation in letter-
of-credit cases9.6 For example, an issuing bank that pays a benefi-
ciary under a letter of credit (Contract III) will not be allowed to
be subrogated to the Contract I rights of the beneficiary against
the applicant. 0 For subrogation to be permitted, the bank would
have had to issue a guaranty instead of a letter of credit.7 1
A rule allowing subrogation is clearly accepted in guaranty law
and, except for an "all or nothing" approach with respect to letters
of credit, it makes sense to accept this rule in letter-of-credit
transactions as well. Once the issuing bank honors its letter-of-
67. DEMKO, supra note 1, at 99.
68. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1990).
69. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Says. Ass'n v. Kaiser Steel Corp. (In re Kaiser
Steel Corp.), 89 B.R. 150, 152-54 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988). But see In re Minnesota Kicks,
Inc., 48 B.R. 93, 104-07 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (applying the doctrine of subrogation in a
letter-of-credit case).
70. See Kaiser Steel, 89 B.R. at 152-54.
71. See id.
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credit obligation, the policies supporting the independence princi-
ple are satisfied; Contract III (the letter of credit) has been kept
separate from Contract I (the underlying contract). There is no
longer a reason to adhere to a rule that has served its purpose and
is no longer relevant.7 2 This argument seems stronger still when we
realize that the doctrine of subrogation can be worked into a let-
ter-of-credit transaction through a documentary payment condi-
tion; that is, as a condition of payment, the beneficiary can be re-
quired to provide the issuing bank with a written assignment of its
Contract I rights against the applicant.
If the courts were to allow subrogation in letter-of-credit cases, it
would not necessarily follow that all other "guaranty" rules must
also be applied wholesale to letters of credit. There is room for
some picking and choosing consistent with the dominant purpose
of the basic payment mechanism-beneficiary orientation in the
case of a standby credit and applicant orientation in the case of a
contract of guaranty. Dynamic borders will allow for some jutting
excrescences.
72. See, e.g., Michael E. Avidon, Subrogation in the Letter of Credit Context, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 129, 136-38 (1990).
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